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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Because this case is an appeal from the final judgment of the
Third Circuit Court, the Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE:

Did the trial judge correctly dismiss the charge

against Appellee by holding that as a matter of law, Section 76-10504 of the Utah Code requires that a concealed dangerous weapon
must be carried in a moving vehicle? (See

West Valley

City

STANDARD

v. Fullmer,

OF

REVIEW:

Transcript of Verdict,

at 1-4.)
A

trial

court's

interpretation

of

statutes is a question of law that is reviewed under a correction
of error standard.
1993); State
court

v. Shipler,

review[s]

State

v. Larsen,

865 P. 2d 1355, 1357

869 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah App. 1994).

questions of law under a correction of

1

(Utah
"This
error

standard, without deference to the trial court."

Shipler,

869 P. 2d

at 969 (citation omitted).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
This

appeal

does

not

involve

an

interpretation

of

any

provision from the federal or Utah Constitutions.
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504
These sections are included in the Addendum to this Brief.
RULES
No procedural rules are at issue in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal concerns the trial judge's dismissal of the charge
against Appellee by ruling that Section 76-10-504 of the Utah Code
requires that a concealed dangerous weapon be physically moved in
order for it to be "carried."

This interpretation of Section 76-

10-504 contradicts the plain language of the statute and the case
law that has interpreted it.

A copy of the trial judge's ruling is

included in the Addendum to this Brief.
RELEVANT FACTS
These facts were introduced at trial, but the only discussion
of the trial judge's interpretation of Section 76-10-504 was in his
final verdict.
ruling

and

Since this appeal concerns the trial judge's final

not

the

evidence,

2

only

that

final

ruling

was

transcribed.

These

facts

are presented

here

for background

purposes.
Early in the morning of May 8, 1995, officers from the West
Valley City Police Department responded to a call reporting a
suspicious person in the parking lot of an apartment complex.

The

police officers arrived and discovered Appellee, Kent R. Fullmer,
("Fullmer") inside the passenger compartment of a vehicle.
officers approached

and requested identification

The

from Fullmer,

which he provided.
The

officers

conducted

a

routine

check

for

outstanding

warrants, which revealed that there were outstanding warrants for
Fullmer.
custody.

Upon

learning this, the officers

took

Fullmer

into

The officers also searched Fullmer's vehicle as part of

the lawful arrest.

The officers discovered a Davis .380 caliber

handgun under the arm rest between the two front seats.

The gun

contained a full clip of bullets, although there was not a bullet
in the chamber.

Another full clip was found next to the gun.

Both

clips contained five rounds.
Fullmer was charged with violating Section 76-10-504 of the
Utah Code, carrying a concealed dangerous weapon.

At a bench trial

held on October 16, 1995, the trial judge dismissed the charge.

He

held that the term "carrying" in the statute required that the
weapon

be

physically

moved.

Under

that

interpretation

of

Section 76-10-504, the trial judge held that as a matter of law the
crime had not been committed.
City

v.

Fullmer,

(Transcript of Verdict, West

at p. 3, In. 11-14) .
3

Valley

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY DISMISSED THE
CHARGE
AGAINST
FULLMER
BECAUSE
HIS
INTERPRETATION THAT SECTION 76-10-504 REQUIRES
THAT A WEAPON BE PHYSICALLY MOVED IN A VEHICLE
IN ORDER TO BE "CARRIED" CONTRADICTS THE
LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE AND CASES THAT HAVE
INTERPRETED THE STATUTE.
The trial judge's dismissal of the charges against Fullmer
contradicts the language of the Utah Code and Utah case law.

The

Utah Code does not require physical movement of a concealed weapon,
only that it be "readily accessible for immediate use."
Ann.

§

76-10-501 (2) (a)

(Supp.

1995).

A

weapon

Utah Code
is

readily

accessible for immediate use if it "is carried on the person or
within such close proximity and in such a manner that it can be
retrieved and used as readily as if carried on the person."
§ 76-10-501 (2) (0 .

Id.

Nothing in this language requires movement or

implies that movement is necessary.

In fact, a weapon could be

secreted in non-moving vehicle, and still be "carried," if a person
has control over the weapon and is close enough that the weapon
could be easily retrieved.
that

Thus, the Utah Code does not require

a weapon must be physically moved in order for it to be

"carried."
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has clarified the meaning
of the term "carried."

In State v. Williams,

636 P.2d 1092 (Utah

1981) , the court held that the term "carry" means having the weapon
under
Williams,

control

and

within

636 P. 2d at 1094.

immediate,
In Williams,

easy,

or

ready

a handgun was secreted on

the front seat of a vehicle, much like the present case.
4

access.

Whether

the vehicle had moved or not made no difference to the court's
analysis.

In

interpretation

fact,

the

extended

court

specifically

to weapons

concealed

Williams,

whether or not the vehicle moved.

agreed

that

its

within vehicles,

636 P. 2d at 1095.

In

similar fashion, the charges against Fullmer should not have been
dismissed simply because his vehicle did not move.
The trial judge's interpretation of Section 76-10-504 was
incorrect.

The ruling has no basis in the statute and directly

contradicts Utah case law.

Carrying a concealed dangerous weapon

is criminal conduct because of the danger that is posed to the
public, not because of the transportability of the weapon in a
vehicle or on a person's clothing.
movement,

but

by

Carrying is not determined by

accessibility.

The

trial

judge

improperly

dismissed the charge simply because the vehicle had not moved.

The

trial judge's ruling should therefore be set aside and this case
retried.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY DISMISSED THE
CHARGE
AGAINST
FULLMER
BECAUSE
HIS
INTERPRETATION THAT SECTION 76-10-504 REQUIRES
THAT A WEAPON BE PHYSICALLY MOVED IN A VEHICLE
IN ORDER TO BE "CARRIED" CONTRADICTS THE
LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE AND CASES THAT HAVE
INTERPRETED THE STATUTE.
The

trial

judge

improperly

dismissed

the

charge

against

Fullmer because his interpretation of Section 76-10-504 contradicts
the plain language of the statute and case law that has interpreted
it.

Nothing in the statute or in cases interpreting the statute

requires

that

a

weapon

be

physically
5

moved

in

order

to

be

u

carried."

Since the trial judge based his decision to dismiss the

charge on this erroneous interpretation of Section 76-10-504, the
decision should be set aside, and the case retried.
The trial judge's interpretation of Section 76-10-504 is not
supported by the plain language of the statute.

Nothing in the

language of Sections 76-10-501 to -504, which deal with carrying a
concealed dangerous weapon, requires that a concealed dangerous
weapon be physically moved in order to be "carried."
statute

does

not

define

the

term

concealed dangerous weapon as one

"carry,"
u

it

Although the

does

define

a

that is covered, hidden, or

secreted . . . and is readily accessible for immediate use."
Code Ann. § 76-10-501(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1995).

ux

Utah

Readily accessible

for immediate use' means that a . . . weapon is carried on the
person or within such close proximity and in such a manner that it
can be retrieved and used as readily as if carried on the person."
Id.

§ 76-10-501(2) (0 . Thus, if a weapon is hidden but still easily

retrievable, it may be a concealed dangerous weapon, regardless of
whether it physically moves or not.
For example, a handgun could be brought to a vehicle parked on
a street, where it could be hidden where it is readily accessible
for immediate use by a person seated inside.

According to the

statute, a concealed dangerous weapon is one that is carried on the
person, or is within such close proximity that it can be retrieved
and used as readily as if carried on the person.

Even though the

vehicle does not physically move, the handgun would be a concealed

6

dangerous

weapon.

Physical movement

of

the weapon

is not a

requirement of ''carrying."
The trial judge's ruling also contradicts the interpretation
given

to

the

statute by the Utah Supreme

Court.

clarified the meaning of the term "carry" in State
P.2d 1092 (Utah 1981).

The

court

v. Williams,

636

In that case, police officers pulled the

defendant over for a traffic violation, and did a routine check for
outstanding

warrants.

Because

the

defendant

had

outstanding

warrants, he was placed under arrest and his car impounded.

The

officers discovered a handgun in a satchel that was placed on the
front seat of the vehicle, easily accessible to defendant.

The

defendant was charged with carrying a concealed dangerous weapon
under the predecessor statute to Secton 76-10-504.1

Id.

636 P.2d

at 1093-94.
On appeal, the defendant argued that he was not "carrying" the
weapon

on his person, and

carrying

a

concealed

should not have been

dangerous

weapon.

The

convicted

trial

judge

of
had

instructed the jury that the weapon only needed to be accessible,
but not necessarily on the person of the defendant.

The defendant

had requested an instruction that limited the offense to weapons
actually carried on person of the offender.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

affirmed

Id. , 636 P.2d at 1094.
the

trial

judge's

interpretation of the statute, and held that a person is carrying
1

The Utah Legislature has changed Section 76-10-504 twice
since 1981. The statute was reworded in 1982 and 1995. However,
the language at issue has remained unchanged since Williams
was
decided. See 1995 Utah Laws ch. 80, § 2; 1982 Utah Laws ch. 17,
§ 1.
7

a weapon when the weapon is in the person's control and within
immediate, easy, or ready access.

The court focused on the purpose

of Section 76-10-504:
Clearly, the purpose of concealed weapons statutes is to
protect the public by preventing an individual from
having on hand a weapon of which the public is unaware
and which the individual might use should he be so in
inclined. . . . As a factual matter, where the concealed
weapon is shown to be under defendant's control and
within his immediate, easy or ready access, he will be
deemed to be "carrying" the weapon.
Williams,

636 P. 2d at 1094.

Whether the vehicle moved or not made

no difference to the court's analysis.

A weapon may be under a

person's control and within his or her immediate access without
being moved in a vehicle.
that

its

In fact, the court specifically agreed

interpretation applied to weapons hidden

within easy reach of a person.

Id.,

to

is

the

court,

mobility.

accessibility

in vehicles

636 P.2d at 1095.
the

determining

According

factor,

not

Therefore, an individual is "carrying" a weapon when

that weapon is secreted in an automobile within the immediate,
easy, or ready access of the person.

Whether the automobile moves

or not is immaterial.
The charge against Fullmer should not have been dismissed
because

this

Williams.
and

Williams

case

is nearly

identical

factually

to

State

v.

The only significant difference between the present case
is that

the vehicle

in Williams

moved

while

it

contained a hidden handgun, and in the present case the vehicle had
not moved.

The other facts are nearly the same.

Fullmer was first

approached by officers investigating a complaint, and Williams was
pulled over in a routine traffic stop.
8

Both Fullmer and Williams

were

taken

into

custody

outstanding warrants.
lawful

arrests.

A

because

a

routine

check

revealed

Both vehicles were searched because of the
handgun was discovered

in both vehicles.

Williams was found to have carried a concealed dangerous weapon,
and

so should

irrelevant.

Fullmer.
Because

Whether the vehicle moved or not

his

interpretation

of

Section

is

76-10-504

contradicts the Utah Supreme Court, the trial judge improperly
dismissed the charge against Fullmer, and that decision should be
set aside.
The trial judge discussed Williams
decision.

He held that Williams

when he announced his final

did not apply to this case because

the car was not moving.
State
v. Williams,
though [dealt with] a vehicle that's
moving as opposed to one that's stationary.
If [Fullmer' s vehicle] had been moving, clearly carrying extends
to a vehicle that's moving; but if it's not moving, then
it's not any different than placing it in a room some
place.
In this case, the vehicle wasn't moving and had not been
moving with the weapon in that location, so I'm going to
find that it doesn't meet the definition as carried.
(Transcript of Verdict, West

Valley

City

v. Fullmer,

at p. 3, In.

2-14) . As has been discussed, this interpretation has no basis in
the statute or in case law.
The
Section

judge's
76-10-504:

ruling

impermissibly

creates

a

loophole

in

A person is not carrying a concealed dangerous

weapon if he or she can show that the weapon did not move.

The

legislature criminalized this conduct because of the severe threat
to public safety caused by concealed weapons.
9

See

Williams,

636

P.2d at 1094-95.

The threat is equally severe whether the weapons

are located in moving or non-moving vehicles.

If the legislature

had intended to excuse weapons that are not actually moved while
concealed,

the

legislature would have done so.

Instead,

the

offense is defined in terms of accessibility, whether the weapon
has been moved or not.
The trial judge held that a vehicle must move with the weapon
before

the

dismissed

weapon
the

will

charges

be

deemed

against

to

be

Fullmer.

"carried,"
This

and

thus

interpretation

contradicts the plain meaning of the statute and the interpretation
given to the statute by the Utah Supreme Court.

It also creates a

ridiculous exemption from the law if the individual can show that
the weapon was concealed in a non-moving vehicle.

Therefore, the

ruling was in error, and it should be set aside.
CONCLUSION
"Clearly, where the weapon is immediately and easily accessible,

the

fair

import of the law is that

'carrying' the weapon."
(Utah 1981).

State

v. Williams,

the

individual

is

636 P.2d 1092, 1095

The Utah Supreme Court could not have used plainer

language to define "carrying" for the purposes of Section 76-10504.

Movement of a vehicle has nothing to do with whether a weapon

was "carried" or not.

The relevant question is whether Fullmer had

ready access to the weapon, not whether his automobile moved while
it contained the weapon.
The language of Section 76-10-501 states that a concealed
dangerous weapon is one that is hidden but readily accessible for
10

immediate use.

Movement in a vehicle is not critical.

A weapon in

a non-moving vehicle is still a concealed dangerous weapon, and the
threat

to the public from that weapon is as real as when the

vehicle moves.

However, the interpretation of the trial judge

exempts people who conceal weapons in non-moving vehicles.

This

interpretation has no basis in the statute or in the decision of
the Utah Supreme Court that defines the term "carrying."
In

State

v.

Williams

the court

found

that

the defendant

"carried" a handgun by hiding it in his vehicle where he could
easily access it.

The only significant difference between

and the present case is that in Williams

Williams

the vehicle had moved with

the handgun, and in the present case the vehicle had not moved.
Such a difference is immaterial to the question of whether the
weapon was under Fullmer's control and readily
immediate

use.

The

trial

judge

accessible

impermissibly

found

for
that

distinction material, and dismissed the charges simply because
Fullmer's vehicle had not moved while it contained the weapon.
That decision was in error, and it should be set aside
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court set aside the
trial court's order dismissing the charges against Fullmer, and
allow the case to be retried.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of April, 1996.

ELLIOT R. LAWRENCE
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This certifies that a copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief
was mailed to the following address:
Boyd M. Fullmer
3211 South 2045 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84109

DATED this 1st day of April, 1996.

ELLIOT R. LAWKEtfCE
Attorney fo^r Appellant

ADDENDUM 1
Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-10-501 to -504.
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CRIMINAL CODE

nitrate, ammonium nitrate, fuel oil mixtures, cast
primers and boosters, R.D.X., P.E.T.N., electric and
nonelectric blasting caps, exploding cords commonly
called detonating cord, detcord, or primacord, picric
acid explosives, T.N.T. and T.N.T. mixtures, nitroglycerin and nitroglycerin mixtures, or any other chemical mixture intended to explode with fire or force;
(ii) any explosive bomb, grenade, missile, or similar device; and
(iii) any incendiary bomb, grenade, fire bomb,
chemical bomb, or similar device, including any device, except kerosene lamps, if criminal intent has not
been established, which consists of or includes a
breakable container including a flammable liquid or
compound and a wick composed of any material
which, when ignited, is capable of igniting the flammable liquid or compound or any breakable container
which consists of, or includes a chemical mixture that
explodes with fire or force and can be carried, thrown,
or placed.
(b) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary device" shall not
include rifle, pistol, or shotgun ammunition.
(c) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts" means
any substances or materials or combinations which have
been prepared or altered for use in the creation of an
explosive, chemical, or incendiary device. These substances or materials include:
(i) timing device, clock, or watch which has been
altered in such a manner as to be used as the arming
device in an explosive;
(ii) pipe, end caps, or metal tubing which has been
prepared for a pipe bomb; and
(iii) mechanical timers, mechanical triggers,
chemical time delays, electronic time delays, or commercially made or improvised items which, when
used singly or in combination, may be used in the
construction of a timing delay mechanism, booby
trap, or activating mechanism for any explosive,
chemical, or incendiary device.
(d) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts" shall not
include rifle, pistol, or shotgun ammunition, or any signaling device customarily used in operation of railroad
equipment.
(2) The provisions in Subsections (3) and (6) shall not apply
o:
(a) any public safety officer while acting in his official
capacity transporting or otherwise handling explosives,
chemical, or incendiary devices;
(b) any member of the armed forces of the United
States or Utah National Guard while acting in his official
capacity;
(c) any person possessing a valid permit issued under
the provisions of Uniform Fire Code, Article 77, or any
employee of such permittee acting within the scope of his
employment;
(d) any person possessing a valid license as an importer, wholesaler, or display operator under the provisions of the Utah Fireworks Act, Sections 11-3-3.2 and
11-3-3.5; and
(e) any person or entity possessing or controlling an
explosive, chemical, or incendiary device as part of its
lawful business operations.
(3) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly
possesses or controls an explosive, chemical, or incendiary
device is guilty of a felony of the second degree.
(4) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly:
(a) uses or causes to be used an explosive, chemical, or
incendiary device in the commission of or an attempt to
commit a felony; or

76-10-501

(b) injures another or attempts to injure another in his
person or property through the use of an explosive,
chemical, or incendiary device, is guilty of a felony of the
first degree.
(5) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly
removes or causes to be removed or carries away any explosive, chemical, or incendiary device from the premises where
said explosive, chemical, or incendiary device is kept by the
lawful user, vendor, transporter, or manufacturer without the
consent or direction of the lawful possessor is guilty of a felony
of the second degree.
(6) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly
possesses any explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts is guilty
of a felony of the third degree.
1993
76-10-307.

Delivery to c o m m o n carrier, mailing, or
p l a c e m e n t on p r e m i s e s .
Every person who delivers or causes to be delivered to any
express or railway company or other common carrier, or to any
person, any explosive, chemical, or incendiary device, knowing
it to be the device, without informing the common carrier or
person of its nature, sends it through the mail, or throws or
places it on or about the premises or property of another or in
any place where another may be injured thereby in his person
or property, is guilty of a felony of the second degree.
1993
76-10-308.

Explosive, chemical, or i n c e n d i a r y d e v i c e —
Venue of prosecution for s h i p p i n g .
Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly delivers any explosive, chemical, or incendiary device to any
person for transmission without the consent or direction of the
lawful possessor may be prosecuted in the county in which he
delivers it or in the county to which it is transmitted.
1993
76-10-309.

Repealed.

1993
PART 4
FENCES

76-10-401. F e n c i n g of shafts a n d w e l l s .
Any person who has sunk or shall sink a shaft or well on the
public domain for any purpose shall inclose it with a substantial curb or fence, which shall be at least four and one-half feet
high. Any person violating the provisions of this section is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
1973
PART 5
WEAPONS
76-10-501. Uniform law — Definitions.
(1) (a) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a
constitutionally protected right, the Legislature finds the
need to provide uniform laws throughout the state. Except as specifically provided by state law, a citizen of the
United States or a lawfully admitted alien shall not be:
(i) prohibited from owning, possessing, purchasing, transporting, or keeping any firearm at his place
of residence, property, business, or in any vehicle
under his control; or
(ii) required to have a permit or license to purchase, own, possess, transport, or keep a firearm,
(b) This part is uniformly applicable throughout this
state and in all its political subdivisions and municipalities. All authority to regulate firearms shall be reserved to
the state except where the Legislature specifically delegates responsibility to local authorities. Unless specifically authorized by the Legislature by statute, a local
authority may not enact or enforce any ordinance, regulation, or rule pertaining to firearms.

76-10-502

CRIMINAL CODE

(2) As used in this part:
(a) (i) "Concealed dangerous weapon" means a dangerous weapon that is covered, hidden, or secreted in a
manner that the public would not be aware of its
presence and is readily accessible for immediate use.
(ii) A dangerous weapon shall not be considered a
concealed dangerous weapon if it is a firearm which is
unloaded and is securely encased.
(b) "Crime of violence" means aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery,
burglary, housebreaking, extortion, or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault with intent to commit any offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, arson
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, or an
attempt to commit any of these offenses.
(c) "Criminal history background check" means a criminal background check conducted by a licensed firearms
dealer on every purchaser of a handgun through the
division or the local law enforcement agency where the
firearms dealer conducts business.
(d) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the
manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing
death or serious bodily injury. The following factors shall
be used in determining whether a knife, or any other item,
object, or thing not commonly known as a dangerous
weapon is a dangerous weapon:
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing;
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any;
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or
thing was used; and
(iv) the other lawful purposes for which the instrument, object, or thing may be used.
(e) "Dealer" means every person who is licensed under
crimes and criminal procedure, 18 U.S.C. 923 and engaged in the business of selling, leasing, or otherwise
transferring a handgun, whether the person is a retail or
wholesale dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise.
(f) "Division" means the Law Enforcement and Technical Services Division of the Department of Public Safety,
created in Section 53-5-103.
(g) "Firearm" means a pistol, revolver, shotgun, sawedoff shotgun, rifle or sawed-off rifle, or any device that
could be used as a dangerous weapon from which is
expelled a projectile by action of an explosive.
(h) "Fully automatic weapon" means any firearm which
fires, is designed to fire, or can be readily restored to fire,
automatically more than one shot without manual reloading by a single function of the trigger.
(i) "Firearms transaction record form" means a form
created by the division to be completed by a person
purchasing, selling, or transferring a handgun from a
dealer in the state.
(j) "Handgun" means a pistol, revolver, or other firearm
of any description, loaded or unloaded, from which any
shot, bullet, or other missile can be discharged, the length
of which, not including any revolving, detachable, or
magazine breech, does not exceed 12 inches.
(k) "Prohibited area" means any place where it is
unlawful to discharge a firearm.
(1) "Readily accessible for immediate use" means that a
firearm or other dangerous weapon is carried on the
person or within such close proximity and in such a
manner that it can be retrieved and used as readily as if
carried on the person.
(m) "Sawed-off shotgun" or "sawed-off rifle" means a
shotgun having a barrel or barrels of fewer than 18 inches
in length, or in the case of a rifle, having a barrel or
barrels of fewer than 16 inches in length, or any danger-
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ous weapon made from a rifle or shotgun by alteration,
modification, or otherwise, if the weapon as modified has
an overall length of fewer than 26 inches.
(n) "Securely encased" means not readily accessible for
immediate use, such as held in a gun rack, or in a closed
case or container, whether or not locked, or in a trunk or
other storage area of a motor vehicle, not including a glove
box or console box.
1996
76-10-502. When w e a p o n d e e m e d loaded.
(1) For the purpose of this chapter, any pistol, revolver,
shotgun, rifle, or other weapon described in this part shall be
deemed to be loaded when there is an unexpended cartridge,
shell, or projectile in the firing position.
(2) Pistols and revolvers shall also be deemed to be loaded
when an unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile is in a
position whereby the manual operation of any mechanism
once would cause the unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile
to be fired.
(3) A muzzle loading firearm shall be deemed to be loaded
when it is capped or primed and has a powder charge and ball
or shot in the barrel or cylinders.
1990
76-10-503.

P u r c h a s e or p o s s e s s i o n of d a n g e r o u s
w e a p o n / h a n d g u n — P e r s o n s not p e r m i t t e d to
h a v e — Penalties.
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of
violence under the laws of the United States, this state, or
any other state, government, or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has been
declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in
his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in this part.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a
firearm or sawed-off shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree
felony.
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony
may not have in his possession or under his custody or
control any dangerous weapon as defined in this part.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of
a third degree felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a
firearm, explosive, or incendiary device he is guilty of a
second degree felony.
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any
handgun described in this part who:
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other
state;
(ii) is under indictment;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance
as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as
provided in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159,107 Stat. 1536 (1993), or has
been committed to a mental institution;
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the
United States;
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces
under dishonorable conditions; or
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the
United States, has renounced such citizenship.
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (3) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
IW*

76-10-504. Carrying c o n c e a l e d d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n .
(1) Except as provided in Section 76-10-503 and in Subsections (2) and (3):
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(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous weapon
which is not a firearm on his person or one that is readily
accessible for immediate use which is not securely encased, as defined in this part, in a place other than his
residence, property, or business under his control is guilty
of a class B misdemeanor
(b) a person without a valid concealed firearm permit
who carries a concealed dangerous weapon which is a
firearm and t h a t contains no ammunition is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains ammunition the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor
(2) A person who carries concealed a sawed-off shotgun or a
sawed-off rifle is guilty of a second degree felony
(3) If the concealed firearm is used in the commission of a
crime of violence as defined in Section 76-10-501, and the
person is a party to the offense, the person is guilty of a second
degree felony
(4) Nothing in Subsection (1) shall prohibit a person en
gaged in the lawful taking of protected or unprotected wildlife
as defined in Title 23 from carrying a concealed weapon or a
concealed firearm with a barrel length of four inches or greater
as long as the taking of wildlife does not occur
(a) within the limits of a municipality in violation of
that municipality's ordinances, or
(b) upon the highways of the state as defined in Section
41 6 1

1995

76-10-505

C a r r y i n g l o a d e d firearm in v e h i c l e , o n
street, or in prohibited area.
(1) Unless otherwise authorized by law, a person may not
carry a loaded firearm
(a) in or on a vehicle,
(b) on any public street, or
(c) in a posted prohibited area
(2) A violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor
1990

76-10-505.5. P o s s e s s i o n of a d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n , firea r m , o r sawed-off s h o t g u n o n o r a b o u t s c h o o l
premises — Penalty.
(1) A person may not possess any dangerous weapon, fire
arm, or sawed-off shotgun at a place that the person knows, or
has reasonable cause to believe, is on or about school premises
(2) (a) Possession of a dangerous weapon on or about school
premises is a class B misdemeanor
(b) Possession of a firearm or sawed off shotgun on or
about school premises is a class A misdemeanor
(3) This section applies to any person, except persons au
thonzed to possess a firearm as provided under Sections
53 5 704, 53 5 705, 53A 3 502, 76 10 510, 76 10 511, 76 10
523, and Subsection 76 10 504(2) and as otherwise authorized
by law
(4) This section does not prohibit prosecution of a more
serious weapons offense that may occur on or about school
premises
1993
76-10-506.

Threatening with or using dangerous
w e a p o n i n fight o r q u a r r e l .
Every person, except those persons described in Section
76 10 503, who, not in necessary self defense in the presence
of two or more persons, draws or exhibits any dangerous
weapon in an angry and threatening manner or unlawfully
uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor
1992
76-10-507.

P o s s e s s i o n of d e a d l y w e a p o n w i t h i n t e n t to
assault.
Every person having upon his person any dangerous
weapon with intent to unlawfully assault another is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor
1973

76-10-509.4

76-10-508.

Discharge of firearm from a v e h i c l e , n e a r
highway, o r in direction of a n y p e r s o n , building, o r v e h i c l e .
(1) (a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous
weapon or firearm
(1) from an automobile or other vehicle,
(u) from, upon, or across any highway,
(111) at any road signs placed upon any highways of
the state,
(IV) at any communications equipment or property
of public utilities including facilities, lines, poles, or
devices of transmission or distribution,
(v) at railroad equipment or facilities including
any sign or signal,
(vi) within Utah State Park buildings, designated
camp or picnic sites, overlooks, golf courses, boat
ramps, and developed beaches, or
(vn) without written permission to discharge the
dangerous weapon from the owner or person in
charge of the property withm 600 feet of
(A) a house, dwelling, or any other building, or
(B) any structure in which a domestic animal
is kept or fed, including a barn, poultry yard,
corral, feeding pen, or stockyard
(b) It shall be a defense to any charge for violating this
section that the person being accused had actual permis
sion of the owner or person in charge of the property at the
time in question
(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a class B
misdemeanor unless the actor discharges a firearm under any
of the following circumstances not amounting to criminal
homicide or attempted criminal homicide, in which case it is a
third degree felony
(a) the actor discharges a firearm in the direction of
any person or persons, knowing or having reason to
believe that any person may be endangered,
(b) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass an
other or with intent to damage a habitable structure as
defined in Subsection 76-6-101(2), discharges a firearm in
the direction of any building, or
(c) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass an
other, discharges a firearm in the direction of any vehicle
(3) This section does not apply to a person
(a) who discharges any kind of firearm when- that
person is in lawful defense of self or others, or
(b) who is performing official duties as provided in
Sections 23 20-1 5 and 76-10-523 and as otherwise pro
vided by law
1995
76-10-509 P o s s e s s i o n of d a n g e r o u s w e a p o n b y m i n o r .
(1) A minor under 18 years of age may not possess a
dangerous weapon unless he
(a) has the permission of his parent or guardian to have
the weapon, or
(b) is accompanied by a parent or guardian while he
has the weapon in his possession
(2) Any minor under 14 years of age in possession of a
dangerous weapon shall be accompanied by a responsible
adult
(3) Any person who violates this section is guilty of
(a) a class B misdemeanor upon the first offense, and
(b) a class A misdemeanor for each subsequent offense
1993 (2nd S S )

76-10-509 4. P r o h i b i t i o n of p o s s e s s i o n of c e r t a i n w e a p o n s by m i n o r s .
(1) A minor under 18 years of age may not possess a
handgun
(2) Except as provided by federal law, a minor under 18
years of age may not possess the following
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13
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14

above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that

15

the following proceedings were had.
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3

I f m going to find that the

THE COURT:

4

weapon does in fact meet the requirements of 76-10-

5

501(2)(d), dangerous weapon.

6

its manner of its use or intended use, clearly it is

7

intended to fire projectiles from there, whether or not it

8

is capable because of a malfunction exceeds the definition,

9

The definition talks in terms of its intended use; but 76-

Defines it as any item that in

10

10-504(1)(b) is a person without a valid concealed

11

permit who carries a concealed dangerous weapon.

12

firearm

In this case the testimony that certainly has

13

credible—credibility problems, but the only testimony is

14

that the weapon was placed in the vehicle, it had not been

15

moved in the vehicle.

16

it was traveling, anything in the vehicle that's within

17

certainly arm's length, readily accessible under

18

could be said to be carried.

19

is in such close proximity.

20

If the vehicle had been stopped while

Says carried on the person or

MS. O'BRIEN:

21

interject

501(2)(L)

Your Honor, can I

something?

22

THE COURT:

23

MS. O'BRIEN:

Go ahead.
It's my understanding

24

under State v. Williams that they did discuss in their

25

"carrying", the meaning of "carrying" under the section and

J
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1

it did not require--

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

And the State vs.

3

Williams, though, is a vehicle that's moving as opposed to

4

one that's stationary.

5

carrying extends to a vehicle that's moving; but if it's not

6

moving, then it's not any different than placing it in a

7

room some place,

8

If this had been moving, clearly

MS. O'BRIEN:

9

But any time an officer

stops a vehicle, the vehicle's not going to be moving.

10

THE COURT:

No, but they have seen the

11

vehicle move.

12

had not been moving with the weapon in that location, so I'm

13

going to find that it doesn't meet the definition as

14

carried.

15

In this case, the vehicle wasn't moving and

If they had pulled the car over and found the

16

weapon there, clearly he was carrying the weapon in close

17

proximity; but the vehicle had not been moved.

18

testimony, such as it is, was that it was carried out of the

19

apartment and placed on the seat.

20

The

If he had encased it and put it away before the

21

vehicle moved, he wouldn't be carrying it.

22

wasn't moving and it falls through the cracks.

23

find him not guilty.

24

MR. FULLMER:

25

THE COURT:

But the vehicle
I'm going to

Thank you, your Honor.
The City can certainly

I
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1

appeal since it is a ruling based on a matter of law.. If you

2

want to appeal it, Ms. O'Brien, I'll require that the weapon

3

be held pending the appeal.

4

MS. O'BRIEN:

5

THE COURT:

6

Do you want to at least

consider that option?

7

MS. O'BRIEN:

8

THE COURT:

9

Okay.

The w e a p o n w i l l

(Whereupon, t h i s hearing was concluded.)
I

12
13

I do, your Honor.

h e l d during the duration of the appeal time.

10
11

Okay.

* * *

14
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